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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
James Gerald Rhoads appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a 
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving while under the under the influence and 
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The following rendition of facts is based on testimony presented at trial. On the 
morning of April 10, 2011, Sherry Kreisher, Cara Holland, and Rhoads were at a house 
where Rhoads had been staying ("Jake's house"), and Rhoads and Ms. Holland were 
drinking beer. (Tr., p.117, L.10 - p.120, L.18.) After Rhoads consumed about five or 
six beers, the three left Jake's house and went to a store and bought a gallon of wine, 
and then went to Ms. Kreisher's apartment. (Tr., p.121, Ls.1-22.) While at the 
apartment, Rhoads and Ms. Holland drank wine and were acting like they were drunk. 
(Tr., p.122, L.11 - p.123, L.16.) Rhoads left the apartment for a while to go to a "band 
function" (Tr., p.122, L.20 - p.123, L.19), and upon his return, he and Ms. Holland went 
to the back patio for about ten minutes to smoke cigarettes, and when they returned, 
Rhoads grabbed the bottle of wine and he and Ms. Holland went out the front door. 
(Tr., p.124, L.15 - p.125, L.8.) 
Ms. Kreisher finished watching a movie, and after doing some house chores, she 
noticed that her car was gone from the driveway, and she had not given anyone 
permission to take it. (Tr., p.125, L.11 - p.126, L.6.) After contacting the police and 
reporting the car being taken, she received a call from the police that her "friends that 
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had borrowed [her] car were in an accident and that they had [her] car" on Bogus Basis 
Road. (Tr., p.127, Ls.10-21.) Ms. Kreisher drove to the site of the accident, and saw 
"[her] car being held by a barbed wire fence from rolling down the mountain and a lot of 
damage done to it." (Tr., p.127, L.22 - p.128, L.3.) Ms. Kreisher explained that her car 
was not drivable, it had lots of body damage, the bumper was hanging off, the 
windshield was shattered and the inside was covered in mud. (Tr., p.128, Ls.19-23.) 
While at the scene, Ms. Kreisher watched one of the officers pull Rhoads' sunglasses 
from the car; they were "[n]ext to the driver's seat in between the seat and where the 
door would close." (Tr., p.134, L.24 - p.135, L.25.) 
Ms. Holland testified that she was intoxicated when she was at Ms. Kreisher's 
apartment, and remembered lying on the couch because she was "overly drunk, just 
trying to rest it off .... " (Tr., p.183, L.13-23.) The next thing she remembered was 
looking for cigarettes in the middle console between the two seats in the car, which was 
being driven by Rhoads. (Tr., p.184, L.2 - p.185, L.8.) Ms. Holland next recalled 
"[l]aying back in my seat and waking up, trying to crawl out of the passenger door." (Tr., 
p.185, L.25 - p.186, L.4.) When she was waking up, Rhoads was beside her, trying to 
climb out right behind her. (Tr., p.187, Ls.7-11.) Ms. Holland suffered a slight bruising 
on the top of her head, and after going to an emergency room for treatment a couple of 
days later, she was diagnosed as having a severe concussion, back strain, and 
abdominal strain. 1 (Tr., p.187, L.14 - 190, L.15.) Ms. Holland saw the car a few days 
after the accident, and noticed that the front windshield was shattered on the passenger 
1 Dr. Benjamin Cornett, the physician who examined Ms. Holland on April 13, 2011, 
diagnosed her as likely having suffered a concussion. (Tr., p.282, Ls.8-15.) 
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side in the top corner. (Tr., p.188, Ls.5-20.) Michael Guryan testified that when he 
and his wife were driving down Bogus Basis Road, they "saw two people kind of 
standing, kind of struggling or arguing with each other[,]" who were covered with mud 
from their knees down. (Tr., p.337, Ls.1-22.) Mr. Guryan stopped to see if the couple 
were hurt, and then noticed a car "hanging in the barbed wire off the side of the road 
and put the tailgate down and had them sit down." (Tr., p.338, L.21 - p. 339, L.4.) Mr. 
Guryan and his wife wiped the mud off the two people and noted that "the woman was 
really ticked at the guy. (Tr., p.339, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Guryan saw the woman take a 
swing at the man, "like pounding him on [the) shoulder or the arm ... like a half swing." 
(Tr., p.340, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Guryan called 911 to report the incident, and when he told the 
man that he had done so, the man became pretty upset and the two people involved in 
the accident started walking down the road barefoot. (Tr., p.343, L.10 - p.345, L.1.) 
Mr. Guryan notified dispatch that the two people were taking off, and he was informed 
he could leave, which he did. (Tr., p.345, Ls.7-12.) 
Deputy Sheriff Shannon Miller was dispatched to the crash site, where she 
contacted Ms. Holland and Rhoads. (Tr., p.244, L.11 - p.245, L.16.) Deputy Miller 
noticed that both Ms. Holland and Rhoads were muddy and intoxicated, and "right off 
the bat, they told [her] that a guy named 'Jeff' was driving." (Tr. p.245, L.17 - p.246, 
L.6; p.253, L.s2-18.) Deputy Miller also saw that the car that crashed "was located 
basically on an edge of a cliff. A barbed wire fence was literally holding the car up." 
(Tr., p.247, Ls.14-18.) In the back seat of the crashed car was a gallon of wine. (Tr., 
p.253, L.22 - p.254, L.4.) During the time she was investigating the accident at the 
scene, Ms. Holland and Rhoads sat inside the deputy's patrol vehicle because it was 
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cold outside, and the vehicle's video-recording system that shows the back seat was 
functioning and running. (Tr., p.247, Ls.4-12; p.252, L.13-17; p.254, Ls.13-23; see St. 
Ex. 8.) A review of that videotape shows clearly that Rhoads created the "Jeff" story to 
cover for the fact that he (Rhoads) had been driving the car when it crashed, and, given 
the many times he reminded Ms. Holland about "Jeff" being the driver, he was pre-
occupied with making sure that Ms. Holland would stick to that story. 
Deputy Sheriff Joshua Hale testified that at about 8:00 p.m. on April 10, 2011, he 
went to the crash scene, and Deputy Miller was already there. (Tr., p.297, L.20 - p.298, 
L.18.) After contacting Mr. Holland and Rhoads, both told him that a man named Jeff 
had been driving the car that crashed, and Rhoads said he did not know Jeff, and did 
not know where Jeff went. (Tr., p.300, Ls.3-23; see also p.201, L.1; p.203, L.19 -
p.206, L.3.) Deputy Hale saw a pair of sunglasses "between the driver's side seat and 
the door." (Tr., p.301, Ls.11-13.) Deputy Hale noted that Rhoads "appeared to be 
extremely intoxicated; bloodshot, watery eyes; slurred speech; swaying back and forth; 
mood changes; odor or alcoholic beverage emanating from ... his breath[,]" and after 
Rhoads said he had torn an ACL, the deputy did not have him perform the standardized 
field sobriety tests, and placed him under arrest. (Tr., p.304, L.17 - p.305, L.24.) 
Although Rhoads was uncooperative in giving breath samples during breath testing, he 
ultimately provided two samples that were "allowable" in regard to law enforcement 
policy, which resulted in blood alcohol content readings of .275 and .271. (Tr., p.309, 
L.14 - p.310, L.5; see St. Ex. 9 ("Lifeloc" printout).) Deputy Hale testified that he asked 
Rhoads if he had ever driven the car, and Rhoads said "no." (Tr., p.329, Ls.4-6.) When 
the deputy asked Rhoads, "[w]ould your fingerprints be on the steering?" Rhoads said 
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"[p]robably." (Tr., p.329, Ls.7-8.) When the deputy attempted to ask Rhoads how his 
fingerprints could be on the steering wheel if he had never driven the car, Rhoads 
"became uncooperative and the cussing and the accusations started." (Tr., p.329, L.9-
14.) 
At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Rhoads of felony driving under the 
influence and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. (R., pp.150-152.) The 
district court sentenced Rhoads to concurrent sentences of ten years with four years 
fixed for felony driving under the influence, and five years with four years fixed for 
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. (R., pp.158-163.) Rhoads filed a 
Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35, which was 
denied. (R., pp.178-181, 199-202.) Rhoads filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.164-166.) 
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ISSUE 
Rhoads states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay 
statements of a co-defendant/accomplice where the remarks did not fall 
under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
Was Ms. Holland's initial statement to Rhoads admissible as a prior consistent 
statement such that this Court need not address whether the court abused its discretion 
in concluding it was an excited utterance? Alternatively, has Rhoads failed to establish 




Ms. Holland's Statement To Rhoads Was Admissible As A Prior Consistent Statement 
Such That This Court Need Not Address Whether The Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Concluding It Was An Excited Utterance; Alternatively, Rhoads Has Failed To Establish 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Statement As An Excited 
Utterance 
A Introduction 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, after Ms. Holland had been thoroughly 
cross-examined about fabricating the story that "Jeff' had been the driver of the car, 
Rhoads' attorney said he would object, on hearsay grounds, to any testimony by Mr. 
Guryan that he heard Ms. Holland "say something to James about, 'Look what you did 
to my friend's car."' (Tr., p.230, L.228 - p.231, L.5.) As an offer of proof, the prosecutor 
clarified the legal and factual basis for Mr. Guryan's anticipated testimony: 
[W)hat he intends to testify is that he was working at Bogus Basin. He 
came down. He saw Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads on the side of the road 
and stopped to render assistance. 
As he was coming up to them, at some point during that 
conversation or during that contact, Ms. Holland appeared to be highly 
agitated specifically with Mr. Rhoads, turned to him and stated, "I can't 
believe you wrecked" someone's name - he couldn't recall the name -
"car." 
We do intend to admit that statement pursuant to 801 (d)(1 )(B). 
(Tr., p.229, L.20 - p.230, L.12.) After the prosecutor read I.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) to the 
court (Tr., p.230, Ls.12-18), and Rhoads' counsel asserted the statement was hearsay 
(Tr., p.231, Ls.18-20), the court opined: 
No, it is not for the truth of the matter. It is offered to rebut an 
implication that the prior witness had fabricated testimony. It is not offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted. It is offered to show that she made a 
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consistent statement with regard to Mr. Rhoads driving the vehicle, and 
she has been attacked and cross-examined significantly over the issue of 
her recollection that Mr. Rhoads was driving the vehicle and got out of the 
car after her from the driver's seat. 
(Tr., p.231, L.21 - p.232, L.6.) 
Rhoads' attorney responded, "Judge, I agree with you," but asserted that the 
statement would be double hearsay. (Tr., p.232, Ls.8-10.) At that point, the district 
court explained that the statement "is a prior consistent statement which she made[,]" 
and offered to "instruct the jury that this is not proof; this is merely an indication that she 
made a prior statement consistent with her testimony. It is not proof that this actually 
happened this way; it is proof that she made a prior consistent statement." (Tr., p.232, 
Ls.11-21.) The court gave Rhoads the option of having a limiting instruction read to the 
jury either immediately after the statement was presented or when the other jury 
instructions were given; Rhoads' counsel asked for time to talk to Rhoads, but did not 
comment further at the time about which option he desired. (Tr., p.233, L.18 - p.234, 
L.1.) 
After Rhoads and his attorney discussed matters, the district court raised the 
"excited utterance" exception as another basis for admitting the statement, saying: 
There is a basis also for an excited utterance, based upon what you have 
told me, in terms of they had just gotten [sic] into the car. They just gotten 
[sic] out of the car. She was still under the impact of what was going on 
and made an excited utterance that was also a consistent statement. 
(Tr., p.234, L.23 - p.235, L.4.) The prosecutor then made an offer of proof to support 
an "excited utterance" ground for admitting Ms. Holland's statement, and Rhoads' 
counsel argued that the exception did not apply because Ms. Holland had had time to 
reflect after the car accident. (Tr., p.235, Ls.8-17; p.236, L.24 - p.237, L.5.) The court 
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ruled that, subject to laying a foundation, the state could introduce Ms. Holland's 
statement at trial as an excited utterance. (Tr., p.238, Ls.2-6.) 
Later in the trial, the district court read the limiting instruction it intended to give 
the jury in regard to Mr. Guryan's testimony about Ms. Holland's statement, on the 
assumption the statement would be admitted as a prior consistent statement. (Tr., 
p.268, L.11 - p.270, L.7.) The prosecutor objected to the limiting instruction, contending 
that if the statement was admitted as an excited utterance, it "should come in as 
substantive." (Tr., p.270, Ls.16-22.) Rhoads' counsel did not object to the proposed 
limiting instruction, but requested he "be able to wait or make comment" on the 
instruction until after Mr. Guryan testified. (Tr., p.272, Ls.3-7.) The court agreed with 
the prosecutor, saying, "[i]f it is an excited utterance, it comes in for all purposes. If I 
determine there is not a basis for an excited utterance, it comes in as an attack on the -
or for rehabilitation of the witness with a prior consistent statement." (Tr., p.272, Ls.9-
14.) 
Mr. Guryan testified that, after working a ski patrol shift at Bogus Basin, he and 
his wife drove down the road and "saw two people kind of standing, kind of struggling or 
arguing with each other[,]" who were covered with mud from their knees down. (Tr., 
p.337, Ls.1-22.) Mr. Guryan pulled to the side of the road and stopped his car to see if 
the couple (Ms. Holland and Rhoads) were hurt, and "then we saw a car, like, hanging 
in the barbed wire off the side of the road and put the tailgate down and had them sit 
down." (Tr., p.338, L.21 - p. 339, L.4.) Mr. Guryan explained that he and his wife 
wiped the mud off the two people and that "the woman was really ticked at the guy. And 
she kind of went, you know, "You wreck Cassie's" -- [,]" at which point Rhoads' counsel 
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objected. (Tr., p.339, Ls.15-19.) After both counsel discussed the objection at the 
bench and off the record, Mr. Guryan's testimony continued to lay the foundation for the 
excited utterance exception to be applied to the statement he heard Ms. Holland make, 
testifying that she took a swing at Rhoads, "kind of like pounding him on [the] shoulder 
or the arm, like kind of a half swing." (Tr. p.340, Ls.9-13.) 
Just before the court made its ruling, Mr. Guryan was asked to more fully 
describe what led him to believe the female was upset, and he explained: 
She was - she yelled at him. She was really mad at him for 
wrecking her friend's car, and she said, "You know, you wrecked Cassie's 
car" or "Karen's car." I couldn't make out the name. She kind of swung at 
him at the same time and said, "You wrecked Cassie's car." She was 
really ticked at him. 
(Tr., p.341, L.21 - p.342, L.3.) Mr. Guryan also testified that when Ms. Holland told 
Rhoads that he wrecked her friend's car, she did not appear to have engaged in "much 
of a thought process ... [s]he was just really mad at him." (Tr., p.342, Ls.7-14.) The 
court stopped the testimony in order to make a finding on the record that, based on Mr. 
Guryan's testimony, the statement by Ms. Holland would be admitted as an excited 
utterance. (Tr., p.342, L.16 - p.343, L.7.) 
After Mr. Guryan's testimony was completed and he was excused, Rhoads' 
counsel inquired about whether a curative instruction was supposed to be given to the 
jury. (Tr., p.354, Ls.13-22.) The court explained that "[t]he reason [it] did not read the 
limiting instruction was that it was based on the fact that the testimony was admitted for 
the limited purpose of basically a prior consistent statement. However, [the prosecutor] 
. . . successfully laid a foundation sufficient to allow that evidence to be admitted 
pursuant to the excited utterance exception." (Tr., p.354, L.23 - p.355, L. 7.) Rhoads' 
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counsel again objected to the admission of Ms. Holland's statement on the ground that 
it "was not contemporaneous to when the incident happened[.]" (Tr., p.355, L.17 -
p.356, L.5.) The court explained its decision in that regard: 
And the Court will note that one of the things that I paid particular 
attention to is the fact that the parties were still muddy from coming up the 
hill, and that is one of the reasons that I made the determination that this 
had occurred, and the parties were still under the influence of the event. 
(Tr., p.356, Ls.6-13.) 
On appeal, Rhoads contends that Mr. Guryan's testimony that he heard Ms. 
Holland tell Rhoads, "I can't believe you wrecked [ ... 's] car," was improperly admitted 
into evidence because, due to the passage of time, it did not qualify as an excited 
utterance. (Appellant Brief, pp.9-15.) Rhoads' claim fails irrespective of whether the 
statement was an excited utterance because the district court also admitted it as a prior 
consistent statement under I.R.E. 801 (d)(1)(B), and Rhoads has not challenged that 
ruling on appeal. 
Regardless, the district court correctly ruled that Ms. Holland's statement was 
admissible both as an excited utterance and prior consistent statement. Moreover, any 
error in admitting the statement was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the province of 
the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(citation omitted). "[A] trial court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial 
will only be reversed where there has been an abuse of that discretion." kt 
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C. Rhoads Has Failed To Show Error Because He Has Not Challenged The District 
Court's Ruling That Ms. Holland's Statement Was Admissible As A Prior 
Consistent Statement Under I.RE. 801(d)(1 )(B) 
On appeal, Rhoads challenges the district court admission of Ms. Holland's 
statement on only one of the court's stated grounds - the excited utterance exception to 
the hearsay rule. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-15.) However, Rhoads has not challenged the 
district court's ruling that Ms. Holland's statement was admissible under I.RE. 
801 (d)(1 )(B) as a prior consistent statement. (Id.; see Tr., p.232, Ls.11-21 (court's 
ruling).) Because Rhoads has not claimed that one of the two bases for admitting the 
evidence was error, his claim of error must be rejected. 
Where a basis for a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate 
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 
956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where trial court rules on two bases, appellate 
court will affirm on basis unchallenged on appeal). At no point on appeal does Rhoads 
address the district court's ruling that Ms. Holland's statement was admissible as a prior 
consistent statement. Thus, Rhoads has failed on appeal to challenge the district 
court's ruling, which ruling must be affirmed for want of challenge. 
Moreover, Rhoads has failed to challenge the district court's decision to not give 
a limiting instruction in regard to the admission of Ms. Holland's statement as a prior 
consistent statement. Although the court did not give such an instruction because it 
also ruled the statement was admissible for substantive purposes as an excited 
utterance (Tr., p.354, L.23 - p.355, L.16), the fact remains that Rhoads has not 
asserted on appeal that the lack of a limiting instruction was error. Because he has not 
challenged either the court's holding that the evidence was properly admitted as a prior 
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consistent statement or that failure to give a limiting instruction was error, Rhoads has 
failed to demonstrate any error in the district court's admission of evidence of Ms. 
Holland's statement 
D. Rhoads Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting The Statement As An Excited Utterance 
Even if this Court addresses Rhoads' claim of error, he has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Ms. Holland's statement that 
Rhoads wrecked the car under the excited utterance exception. 
Rule 803(2) provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition" is "not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness." The excited utterance exception "has two requirements: ( 1) an 
occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective 
thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the declarant must have been 
a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective 
thought" State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568, 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007) (citations 
omitted). In deciding whether a statement satisfies this exception, the Court considers 
the totality of the circumstances "including: 'the amount of time that elapsed between 
the startling event and the statement, the nature of the condition or event, the age and 
condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the 
statement was volunteered or made in response to a question."' kl (quoting State v. 
Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325, 986 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct App. 1999)). 
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Rhoads argues that Ms. Holland's statement that he wrecked her friend's car 
"occurred approximately 20-30 minutes after the accident" (Appellant's Brief, p.9), and 
that she "perhaps made some attempts to free the car" before she scrambled up a 
muddy embankment and began walking/staggering down the road[;]" therefore, Rhoads 
contends, her statement was not an excited utterance because it "was detached both by 
time and distance from the accident" (id. at 13).2 Rhoads' argument places undue 
weight on the district court's subsequent statement that "one of the things [it] paid 
particular attention to is the fact that the parties were still muddy from coming up the hill, 
and that is one of the reasons [it] made the determination that ... the parties were still 
under the influence of the event." (Tr., p.356, Ls.6-13; see Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("the 
presence of mud on one's clothing is not synonymous with a specific length of time").) 
The circumstances surrounding Ms. Holland's statement to Rhoads show the 
district court correctly concluded that the statement was admissible as an excited 
utterance because she was still "under the stress or excitement caused by the [startling] 
event or condition." (Tr., p.342, L.18 - p.343, L.4.) The car Ms. Holland had ridden in 
was found hanging on the edge of a cliff, held up by a barbed wire fence (Tr., p.247, 
Ls.14-18; p.338, L.21 - p.339, L.4), and her legs were covered with mud from the knees 
down after climbing up the hill (Tr., p.337, Ls.1-22). Ms. Holland suffered from a back 
strain, an abdominal strain, and a severe concussion from hitting her head on the 
windshield. (Tr., p.187, L.14 - p.190, L.15.) When Mr. Guryan saw Ms. Holland and 
2 The portion of the record cited by Rhoads in no way supports his asserted time-frame 
of 20 to 30 minutes, and his claim of efforts to free the car is based exclusively on the 
presence of muddy handprints that the witness did not believe resulted from any effort 
to push the car. (See Appellant's Brief, p.9 (citing Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.263, L.1 0; p.337, 
Ls.15-22; p.346, Ls.10-19; p.348, Ls.3-7).) 
14 
Rhoads standing on the road, "she yelled at him," she was "really mad at him for 
wrecking her friend's car," she was "kind of like pounding him on [his] shoulder or the 
arm" like a half-swing, and without "much of a thought process" before she told Rhodes, 
"You wrecked [ .. .'s] car" (Tr., p.337, Ls.20-22; p.341, L.21 - p.342, L.14). 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Rhoads has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting, as an excited utterance, Ms. Holland's 
statement to Rhoads that he wrecked her friend's car. 
E. Ms. Holland's Statement Was Admissible As A Prior Consistent Statement And 
Was Substantive Evidence Of Rhoads' Guilt 
The district court also ruled that Mr. Guryan would be permitted to testify that 
when he encountered Ms. Holland and Rhoads walking on the road, he heard Ms. 
Holland tell Rhoads, "I can't believe you wrecked" [someone's] "car," as a prior 
consistent statement under 1.R.E. 801 (d)(1)(8).3 (Tr., p.230, L.1 - p.232, L.21.) The 
district court was correct to admit Ms. Holland's statement as a prior consistent 
statement. Moreover, the statement was admissible under that hearsay exception as 
substantive evidence of Rhoads' guilt.4 
3 I.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) reads in relevant part: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is . . . (B) consistent with declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, .... 
4 The state acknowledges that the district court admitted Ms. Holland's statement as an 
excited utterance "for all purposes" but would have given a limiting instruction if the 
evidence was admitted only as a prior consistent statement. (Tr., p.268, L.11 - p.270, 
15 
During her direct examination, Ms. Holland testified that Rhoads was driving the 
car when it crashed. (Tr., p.185, Ls.1-5.) Much of Rhoads' cross-examination of Ms. 
Holland focused on her telling officers that a man named "Jeff' was driving the car when 
it crashed, and he had "taken off and left the scene." (Tr., p.205, Ls.14-25; see 
generally Tr., p.200, L.7 - p.206, L.3.) Thus, central to Rhoads' defense and his 
questioning of Ms. Holland was "an express or implied charge against [her] of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive." I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The state was 
permitted to rebut this attack with Ms. Holland's prior consistent statement to Rhoads 
that, "You wrecked [ ... 's] car." Because offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication 
based on statements to the police, evidence of Ms. Holland's statement to Rhoads was 
a prior consistent statement and not hearsay at all. Id. 
Moreover, because the prior consistent statement was not hearsay, Ms. 
Holland's comment to Rhoads should have been ruled admissible as substantive 
evidence of his guilt, as is true of the similarly worded federal counterpart to 1.R.E. 
801 (d)(1 )(B).5 The Idaho Rules of Evidence were adopted January 8, 1985, and made 
L.7; p.272, Ls.10-14.) Even if the excited utterance ground for admission is deemed 
invalid, the statement should have been admissible as a prior consistent statement "for 
all purposes." 
5 F.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) reads: 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. 
The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: 
16 
effective July 1, 1985. When drafting the rules, the Idaho State Bar Evidence 
Committee applied certain criteria designed to promote consistency with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence ("F.R.E."). The committee explained: 
The Committee concluded that the numbering system of the Federal 
Rules should be followed for ease of reference and research. It was also 
determined that when only minor grammatical differences existed between 
the Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules, the language and punctuation of 
the Federal Rules was followed to facilitate the use of the decisions of the 
federal courts and those state courts which have adopted the Federal 
Rules verbatim. The Committee also had in mind the desire of the Idaho 
practitioners for one set of rules applicable in both the state and federal 
courts, but that concern did not outweigh other concerns when variances 
were deemed justified to accommodate Idaho practice. 
M. Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, Introduction, pp.1-2 
(1983). As a result of the committee's expressed criteria, I.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B) was 
adopted and enacted in similar form to F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have embraced 
the premise that the Idaho Rules of Evidence be interpreted consistently with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 273, 723 P.2d 
814, 817 (1986) ("The general rule of construction which this Court has adhered to 
regarding the adoption of statutory language from another jurisdiction is that the 
adoption of that language is presumed to be with that jurisdiction's prior interpretation 
upon it"); State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 86, 705 P.2d 85, 91 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The 
counterpart federal rule of evidence is identical. It logically follows that the federal 
limitation upon extrajudicial statements by coconspirators, which excludes statements 
made during the 'concealment phase' of a conspiracy, should now apply in Idaho"). 
(8) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; .... 
17 
The Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence make it clear 
that, under F.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B), prior consistent statements are admissible as 
substantive proof of a defendant's guilt. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 162 
(1995) (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 801(d)(1)(B), at 773) ("'Prior 
consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the 
rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony 
given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission 
in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally."'). 
Given the similar language employed by F.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B), and as the Advisory 
Committee's Notes explain, "no sound reason is apparent why prior consistent 
statements should not be 'received generally,"' this Court should interpret I.RE. 
801 (d)(1 )(B) consistently with its federal counterpart, and hold that prior consistent 
statements may be used as substantive evidence because they are not hearsay. 
Because the district court correctly determined that Ms. Holland's statement to Rhoads, 
"You wrecked [ .. .'s] car," was a prior consistent statement under the rule, its admission 
as substantive evidence was proper. 
F. Any Error In The Admission Of Ms. Holland's Statement Was Harmless 
Even if the Court concludes that it was error to admit Ms. Holland's statement, 
any error is harmless in light of the weight of the evidence presented at trial showing 
Rhoads' guilt. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.RE. 103(a); see I.C.R. 
18 
52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational 
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999)). 
Applying the standard of whether the evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged error was harmless. If 
this Court finds that Ms. Holland's statement to Rhoads was admissible only as a prior 
consistent statement and only to rehabilitate her trial testimony (vis-a-vis as substantive 
evidence), the difference between the prohibited use and valid use would be miniscule. 
In short, admitting Ms. Holland's statement (that Rhoads was driving) for the limited 
purpose of rehabilitating her substantive trial testimony that Rhoads was driving, is not 
much different than admitting her statement as substantive evidence on its own right. 
Moreover, the evidence of Rhoads' guilt as to his charged conduct was 
overwhelming. The testimony and evidence presented at trial, as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, supra, are relied upon to show that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
statement Ms. Holland made to Rhoads could not have affected the jury's decision to 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Rhoads' convictions for 
felony driving under the influence and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2013. 
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